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Abstract 
Our findings indicate that herding behavior is affected not only by the cultural 
variables already discussed in the literature but also by other variables associated 
with organizational and environmental issues such as governance, technology, 
education and training, business style and conditions, and the development of equity 
and non-equity markets. Some of these act as catalysts, for example governance and 
technology. Others may have a corrective effect, such as the development of financial 
markets, business style, and education and training. If corrective factors are 
sufficiently developed, intentional herding practices could be reduced in the future. 
 
KeyWords: herding, culture, governance, education and training, financial 
development, business style, technology. 
 
 
1-Introduction 
Since ancient times, imitation has been a resource used to learn and to make 
decisions. Herding appears in a market when investors opt to imitate the trading 
practices of those they consider to be better informed, rather than acting upon their 
own beliefs and private information (see Lo [1999] or Loewenstein [2000], among 
others).  
But financial decisions are not necessarily structured decisions. There are no 
complete models involving all the variables affecting the decision and the 
relationships among them (Barberis and Thaler (2003), Shiller and Pound (1989), 
Shiller (1999), Kuran and Sunstein (1999), Stasser and Titus (1985) or Stasser et al. 
(1989)). 
According to Fremount et al. (1970) and Hogarth (2001), decision making is a 
conscious and human process involving both individual and social phenomena. 
Whenever agents are involved in making decisions, a number of factors can affect 
the process they follow and ultimately the decision they make. The factors can be 
organized into three major groups: perception issues (influenced by the background 
and experience of the perceiver), organizational issues (policies and procedures, 
hierarchy, legislation, politics) and environmental issues (economic, financial or 
technological development). 
Previous studies in the literature discuss the relevance of the six dimensions of 
cultural paradigms proposed by Professor Geert Hofstede in order to explain both 
social and individual behavioral patterns. But culture changes very slowly and 
cultural dimensions are only calculated over long periods of time. In order to detect 
the influence on herding of other more dynamic factors, we take into account, in 
addition to the cultural factors suggested in Chang and Lin (2015), other issues that 
have to do with the degree of governance of a country, with its educational and 
professional training system, with the environment in which its companies do 
business, with its technology development and with some specific financial factors 
reflecting the state of its financial development.  
This paper attempts to shed light on general issues (both organizational and 
environmental) influencing the trend towards herding practices in 35 different 
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countries. As personal issues are much more difficult to model, comprise very 
different aspects and are less generalizable (they can, at most, be generalized 
through what we call cultural issues), the main contribution of this paper is based 
on the incorporation of a wide range of organizational and environmental variables 
that may affect herding behavior. We try to analyze whether specific country 
characteristics determine herding intensity.  
The usefulness of this article is twofold. On the one hand, it is interesting to 
know which organizational or environmental issues are able to mitigate or correct 
herding behavior and which factors can enhance or catalyze herding practices. On 
the other hand, our results may shed light on the extent to which herding behavior 
may be avoidable if it is not considered appropriate.  
 
2- Database 
The empirical study focuses on a sample of listed stocks of 35 international 
markets for a 15-year period from January 2000 to June 2015. Market selection is 
based on trying to cover those markets previously analyzed in the literature, 
together with some other stock markets that seem to have been underestimated 
despite their importance in financial terms. The final sample consists of 141,365 
market-day observations and arises from the stock returns of 39,096 companies from 
all the countries under study.  
This study has been carried out using daily returns on all common stocks and 
the daily returns on the market indexes obtained from Datastream (Thomson 
Financial). The database has been checked and corrected according to the 
recommendations of Ince and Porter (2006). In addition to the stock returns and the 
cultural variables associated to perception issues, we use a broad set of variables 
representing the organizational and environmental issues under study. The data are 
obtained from multiple sources. These variables can be grouped as follows, according 
to their communality: 
 
Cultural dimension 
The Hofstede index (2001, 2010) is a six-dimensional model of national cultures. 
The six dimensions comprise the following: power distance index (pdi), individualism 
versus collectivism (idv), masculinity versus femininity (mas), uncertainty avoidance 
index (uai), long-term orientation versus short-term normative orientation (lto) and 
indulgence versus restraint (ivr)1. The effect of these variables on the herding level 
in the markets is not expected to be homogeneous. Since Hofstede introduces six 
representative variables of the cultural dimension, the same number of variables has 
also been used in the other dimensions (see below) for the sake of homogeneity.  
 
Governance dimension 
This group comprises information on how countries exercise authority at an 
institutional level. Greater governance will produce greater confidence in market 
investors, which promotes a greater attraction of all types of investors. This may 
result in investors having more information and confidence in their actions, so 
                                                          
1 Source web page of Hoftsede.  
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herding may decline. However, attracting more investors can result in the 
appearance of uninformed investors, who might induce greater herding. Therefore, 
the observed result on herding is an empirical question. The variables included in 
this group are taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators gathered by the 
World Bank, and are as follows: Voice and accountability (va), political stability and 
absence of violence (ps), government effectiveness (ge), regulatory quality (rq), rule 
of law (rl) and control of corruption (cc). In all cases, the higher the value of the 
variable, the more governance is enhanced. 
 
Technology dimension  
The technological development of a country certainly affects the behavior and 
habits of its inhabitants. A higher technological capacity is associated with more 
training and greater intellectual development. Improved technology produces an 
increase in the dissemination of information and of negotiation, which will induce 
less herding. However, further technological development can democratize access to 
investing, which may cause less informed investors to start trading. The result of the 
effect of these variables on herding is thus an empirical question. The variables 
considered are: Innovation (inn), company spending on R&D (srd), individuals using 
internet % (iui), firm-level technology absorption (tab), technological readiness (trd), 
FDI and technology transfer (fdi)2.  
 
Education and training dimension 
This section comprises variables relating to the quality of education and 
intellectual capacity of the inhabitants of the country. A higher score should lead to 
a lower level of herding, since investors will have a greater capacity for decision-
making and will be less influenced by the actions of other investors. The variables 
included are: Higher education and training (het), availability of research and 
training services (arts), on-the-job training (ojt), extent of staff training (est), 
intellectual property protection (ipp) and quality of scientific research institutions 
(qsri). 
 
Business style and conditions dimension 
The business style of a company directly affects how investors trade in its stocks. 
Insider trading, bad practices or fraud have all led to the collapse of well-known 
companies and had a negative impact on the markets in the recent past. The more 
ethical the behavior of companies, the more transparency they show and the better 
the information they report, then the higher the level of confidence in them will be. 
The effect this may have on herding is evident, since better information about a 
company and greater confidence will generate less uncertainty and, therefore, less 
need for investors to track other investors. The variables used are as follows: 
willingness to delegate authority (wda), business impact of rules on FDI (bir), 
reliance on professional management (rpm), efficacy of corporate boards (ecb), 
                                                          
2 The reference source for information on technology, education and training, and business style and conditions is 
the World Economic Forum. 
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strength of auditing and reporting standards (sars) and ethical behavior of firms 
(ethb). 
  
Financial development dimensions 
The development of the financial market, like governance, can have a diverse 
effect on herding. On the one hand, further development implies more information, 
security and investor confidence, which a priori would indicate less herding. 
However, as in the case of other dimensions, these elements can attract less informed 
investors who need to act in accordance with other participants. Therefore, the final 
result depends on which part has more weight and thus prevails over the other.  
The area of Financial development is analyzed from two different dimensions: 
equity markets and non-equity markets. The development of equity markets 
includes the following variables: Protection of minority shareholders’ interests 
(pmsi), financing through local equity market (flem), efficiency (eff), venture capital 
availability (vca), trustworthiness and confidence (tac) and number of listed 
companies per 1,000,000 people (nlc). The development of non-equity markets 
includes: outstanding international private debt securities to GDP (oipds), 
international debt issues to GDP (idi), life insurance premium volume to GDP (lipv), 
nonlife insurance premium volume to GDP (nlipv), pension fund assets to GDP (pfa) 
and private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (pcdmb) 3. 
 
3- Research Design and Results 
The methodology and results are described in three phases: 
3.1-Phase 1: Herding in the stock markets 
We use the methodology proposed by Chang et al. (2000) and Chiang and Zheng 
(2010) in order to test the presence of herding in a wide range of stock markets.  
Table 1 presents these results. It can be seen that 30 out of the 35 markets 
analyzed exhibit significant herding behavior. Regarding the global estimates, we 
find evidence of significant herding. Our results are in line with those presented in 
Chen (2013) and Chang and Lin (2015), with some minor differences that may be 
attributed to different time periods and to a different estimation process.  
 
3.2-Phase 2: Herding and modulating variables. 
Once the presence of herding has been generally detected in stock markets, it is 
interesting at this stage to test whether some other variables may affect herding 
behavior either reducing or increasing its intensity.  
The analysis consists of estimating the 42 pool regressions of all countries. In 
order to standardize the information and make it comparable, modulating variables 
are transformed into dummy variables. Thus, if a particular observation of a variable 
is above the median of that variable (calculated using all periods and all countries), 
it takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise. The following equation is estimated 
accordingly: 
                                                          
3 The variables to measure this aspect are taken from World Bank information except protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests, financing through local equity market, efficiency, venture capital availability, 
trustworthiness and confidence, all of which are taken from the World Economic Forum.  
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    titititistititititi LogGDPRmDVRmRmRmCSADCSAD ,,62,,52,4,3,21,1,          (1) 
where CSADi,t is the cross-sectional absolute deviation in stock market i on day 
t, Rmi,t is the index return in the same market on the same day and DVs is the 
dummy variable for one individual component of a dimension (a total of 42 individual 
variables). As some of these variables may be closely associated with the level of 
economic development of a country, the natural logarithm of GDP per capita has also 
been included in the regression analysis as a control variable4.  
The results are presented in table 2. They indicate that most of the variables 
analyzed are significant and, with the exception of some cultural variables, their 
effect on herding is corrective. Their positive sign suggests that, individually 
considered, these variables tend to decrease herding practice.  
 
3.3- Phase 3: Estimation of the combined effect of all dimensions on herding. 
At this stage, the first step is to summarize in a factor or indicator the set of 
variables that have been considered within each dimension. Such an indicator is 
calculated for each dimension and for each country under analysis. We use Iterated 
Principal Factor Analysis for factor extraction, our main objective being to reduce 
the dimensionality of our set of multivariate data. We perform this analysis for each 
dimension except for cultural variables, which require individual evaluation given 
their data structure5. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy for 
our dimensions is, in all cases, above 0.5, the minimum corresponding to non-equity 
markets (0.6658) and leaving all others above 0.75, with the maximum attributed to 
governance variables (0.9063). Applying the Minimum Average Partial (MAP) test 
(Velicer, 1976) to the calculated components, only a single factor is needed to 
significantly explain the variance of the original set of variables in our data base. 
The analysis has been performed for each dimension using aggregated data, so that 
the weight of each individual variable in the new indicator remains constant across 
countries. Once the structure of the factor for one dimension is defined, we calculate 
the corresponding dimension factors for each country. 
It can be considered that mediating factors related to financial development, 
governance, intellectuality, business style and technology can be linearly dependent 
(Francis et al (2003), Davis-Friday (2010), Rahman et al. (2010) or Boolaky et al. 
(2013) are some of the examples of the extant research in this area). In order to avoid 
misleading results, these variables need to be orthogonalized. As in equation 1, we 
also include the natural logarithm of GDP per capita. This variable has also been 
orthogonalized. 
Then, we run the following pool regression with fixed effects for each country 
and year: 
                                                          
4 This variable is significantly negative for all estimates. Nevertheless, we have also carried out the pool estimation 
without it and the results do not change significantly. 
5 The lack of aggregation of cultural variables is due, in addition to the invariant structure of the data, to the 
difficulty of attributing a reasonable meaning to the final aggregated indicator. 
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where CVs represents each of the six cultural variables under study, so we carry 
out 6 pool regressions. Each regression includes as independent variables the 
orthogonalized factors representing the dimensions under analysis together with one 
dummy cultural variable.  
Table 3 shows the pool regression results using the White cross-section 
covariance option. The logGDP variable is significantly negative. The herding 
indicator 4 is clearly significantly negative, suggesting that the propensity to market 
consensus is a general finding for the countries under study. With regard to the 
dummy cultural variables, idv and mas are significantly negative, indicating that a 
higher degree of individualism and masculinity increase imitative behavior, whereas 
uncertainty avoidance produces the opposite reaction. Power distance, long-term 
orientation and indulgence are not significant at the usual statistical levels. The 
estimates for the rest of the factors overwhelmingly suggest that both governance 
and technology induce higher herding levels, while higher levels of financial market 
development (both equity and non-equity markets), business style, and knowledge 
and training tend to decrease herding behavior. That is, the effect of herding catalyst 
dimensions (individualism and masculinity, governance and technology) may be 
compensated for by herding corrective dimensions (uncertainty avoidance and 
indulgence, financial market development, business style, and knowledge and 
training). 
 
4- Discussion 
Comparing the results of the combined effect on herding in table 3 with those 
referring to individual orthogonalized cultural variables affecting herding in table 2, 
we can conclude that the mere inclusion of cultural variables can lead to misleading 
interpretations given their interactions with other organizational and 
environmental issues. Individually, all the cultural variables except individualism 
and indulgence promote herding significantly. However, when the combined effect is 
considered, the only variable that keeps its significance and sign is masculinity, 
indicating that higher levels of masculinity increase herding. This result is 
consistent with that obtained in an analysis of cultural variables by Chang and Lin 
(2015). Our results also indicate that other cultural variables lose relevance or 
change from positive/negative estimates to negative/positive estimates when 
combined with organizational or environmental issues. Although it is difficult to 
distinguish empirically whether individualism and masculinity are incentives to 
spurious or intentional herding, there are no clear arguments to rule out 
intentionality bearing in mind that both concepts are related to looking after oneself 
and personal achievement, which clearly influence decision making. 
Something similar occurs with the variables belonging to the governance and 
technology dimensions. When combined, their corresponding factors have negative 
estimates whereas their individual components initially appeared to correct herding 
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behavior. These comparisons suggest that it is advisable to analyze the joint 
influence of all the issues that are thought to affect herding behavior. 
Governance holds much sway over the financial markets. First because of 
regulatory issues, which may sometimes induce uniformity and pooling behavior if 
regulation does not actively strive to induce behavioral diversity. Second because 
perceptions of the quality of public services, policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (fiscal and 
monetary policy, trade agreements or international relations) have a profound effect 
on the financial marketplace, causing either bullish sentiments or market panic. It 
is possible that all these aspects significantly contribute to the existence of an 
unintentional herding that is practised by groups facing similar decision problems 
and information sets and reacting to commonly known public information. In fact, 
as Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) suggest, the most important reasons for 
intentional herd behavior are imperfect information, concern for reputation, and 
compensation structures that compare one´s performance with that of other similar 
professionals. Governance variables seem to be less related with these issues that 
encourage intentional herding.  
Turning now to technology as an instigator of herding, it has already been 
mentioned that this can contribute to the dissemination of information and easing 
the access of investors to market trading. In fact, one important change in trading 
procedures during recent years has been the functioning of high frequency trading 
platforms (HFT) that use powerful computers to transact a large number of orders 
at very fast speeds. This technological progress influences institutional investors' 
trading behavior and the ways in which their trading strategies, in turn, affect 
market quality. Trading by HFT can noticeably improve market liquidity but, 
according to Sornette and Von Der Becke (2011), liquidity may reach a point beyond 
which the risk of herding increases. HFT uses short-term information as well as 
adaptive algorithms and provides liquidity at the expense of other market 
participants. Short term traders may be specifically prone to herding in reaction to 
the same information. Their reactions to the same signal are very similar and even 
can lead to large transient instabilities driving prices further away from their 
fundamentals. According to Xue et al. (2014), HTF produces noise herding which 
camouflages informed trading. 
As previously mentioned, uncertainty avoidance, equity and non-equity market 
development, business style, and education and training are useful for correcting 
herding behavior. Interestingly, when the cultural variable being analyzed is 
masculinity, the education and training dimension is no longer significant even 
though this dimension maintains its mitigating effect when combined with the rest 
of the cultural variables. This suggests the importance of masculinity as an 
explanatory variable for herding in stock markets, indicating that competition, 
achievement and success, with success being defined as being the winner in the field, 
are more significant than professional training. Nevertheless, these attitudes which 
may be thought to reduce herding behavior are in fact promoters of more intense 
herding practices. 
In the light of these findings, can herding, or at least intentional herding, 
eventually be avoided? Some perception factors that can increase herding such as 
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individualism and masculinity are cultural values and, therefore, hardly modifiable. 
Their influence on intentional herding practice is almost unavoidable. However, 
organizational and environmental factors are more easily modifiable. A higher level 
of governance is desirable because it induces trust and confidence. Nevertheless, this 
reduction in uncertainty may reduce the interest in information acquisition. In 
parallel, technological developments and especially information technologies favor 
relational capital and information acquisition needed for decision-making. These 
dimensions reduce the cost of information acquisition and therefore, in the absence 
of further incentives, contribute to herding practices. Although the benefits of both 
a better level of governance and technological development may suggest that herding 
cannot be avoided, we must consider that both governance and technology have a 
marginal catalytic effect on intentional herding which may be offset by the corrective 
forces originated by other dimensions. In fact, approximately 60% of the countries 
under analysis with the highest levels of governance and technology also have the 
highest levels of financial development, education and training, and business style. 
At the same time, the 40% of countries with the lowest levels of governance and 
technology have, in turn, the lowest levels of other dimensions. These data, while 
confirming the need for the orthogonalization process, suggest that a sufficient 
strengthening of corrective factors such as the development of equity and non-equity 
financial markets, education and training or business style and conditions, all of 
which clearly depend on political, social and organizational will, could well lead to a 
reduction in intentional herding practices in the future. 
 
5-Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to verify empirically whether herding is linked to a group 
of variables associated with cultural, institutional, financial, economic, educational 
and technological factors that are likely to affect investors’ behavior and decisions. 
Our findings indicate that herding behavior, which is found in 30 out of the 35 
countries under analysis, is affected not only by the cultural variables previously 
reported in the literature but also by other variables associated with organizational 
and environmental issues such as governance, technology, education and training, 
business style and conditions, and the development of equity and non-equity 
markets. Some of these act as catalysts to herding, for example individualism and 
masculinity as cultural variables, governance and technology. Other variables and 
factors may correct herding behavior, for example uncertainty avoidance, the 
development of financial markets, business style, and education and training. 
If corrective factors which clearly depend on political, social and organizational 
will are sufficiently strengthened, intentional herding practices could be reduced in 
the future. These results are important for policy makers concerned with the 
possibilities of market integration or with unifying restrictions or regulations in 
stock markets. They should take into account the importance of each country´s 
characteristics and how these can affect investors´ decisions. Investors should also 
consider this information when they trade in different markets in order to achieve 
internationally diversified portfolios. 
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Table 1. International Herding. We run regressions of cross-sectional absolute standard deviations (CSAD) on 
the past CSAD, market return, absolute market return and squared market return. The table reports the estimated 
coefficients and Adjusted R-squared. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Ordinary least square regression with White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors is used in individual 
country estimation. Pool equation uses ordinary least squares regression with cross-section fixed effects and year 
dummies. The estimator is designed to accommodate heteroscedasticity (White cross section standard errors). 
 
Equation 0: 
  titiitiitiitiiiti RmRmRmCSADCSAD ,2,4,,3,,2,1,1,0,,     
 
Country i,0 i,1 i,2 i,3 i,4 Adj-R2 
       
All 0.007*** 0.480*** -0.009*** 0.557*** -5.068*** 0.796 
Argentina 0.006*** 0.282*** 0.047*** 0.715*** -3.400*** 0.767 
Australia 0.011*** 0.495*** 0.022* 0.552*** 0.374 0.812 
Austria 0.006*** 0.295*** -0.041*** 0.909*** -3.631** 0.632 
Belgium 0.005*** 0.404*** 0.007 0.766*** -3.914*** 0.657 
Brazil 0.005*** 0.445*** 0.026*** 0.691*** -5.990*** 0.701 
Canada 0.011*** 0.456*** 0.077*** 0.841*** -4.188*** 0.482 
Chile 0.003*** 0.223*** 0.071*** 0.966*** 3.222 0.798 
China 0.003*** 0.715*** -0.092*** 0.136*** -1.193*** 0.711 
Denmark 0.003*** 0.643*** 0.005 0.545*** -2.918*** 0.770 
Finland 0.004*** 0.575*** 0.009 0.483*** -4.007*** 0.688 
France 0.004*** 0.566*** 0.026*** 0.697*** -3.102*** 0.806 
Germany 0.008*** 0.488*** 0.077*** 0.590*** 2.763*** 0.797 
Greece 0.005*** 0.648*** -0.014** 0.357*** -3.620*** 0.596 
Hong Kong 0.010*** 0.362*** 0.078*** 0.583*** -1.976*** 0.615 
Indonesia 0.007*** 0.415*** 0.050*** 0.768*** -2.370*** 0.788 
Ireland 0.007*** 0.403*** 0.021* 0.759*** -2.683** 0.552 
Italy 0.003*** 0.638*** 0.015*** 0.345*** -2.226*** 0.802 
Japan 0.003*** 0.690*** -0.019*** 0.303*** -1.548* 0.809 
South Korea 0.004*** 0.745*** -0.077*** 0.265*** -2.374*** 0.822 
Malaysia 0.007*** 0.446*** 0.043*** 0.479*** -2.724*** 0.795 
Mexico 0.004*** 0.314*** 0.032*** 0.718*** 4.476*** 0.770 
Netherlands 0.004*** 0.555*** 0.018** 0.461*** -2.993*** 0.684 
New Zealand 0.006*** 0.346*** 0.005 0.720*** -3.271*** 0.524 
Norway 0.006*** 0.545*** 0.025*** 0.500*** -0.487 0.736 
Philippines 0.007*** 0.366*** 0.062*** 0.800*** -1.646* 0.747 
Portugal 0.006*** 0.301*** 0.021** 0.906*** -8.345*** 0.581 
Singapore 0.006*** 0.484*** 0.037*** 0.628*** -4.301*** 0.832 
South Africa 0.007*** 0.447*** -0.013 0.769*** -8.544*** 0.517 
Spain 0.004*** 0.453*** 0.005 0.618*** -3.844*** 0.767 
Sweden 0.007*** 0.623*** 0.038*** 0.445*** -2.002** 0.703 
Switzerland 0.004*** 0.525*** 0.030*** 0.591*** -2.614** 0.792 
Taiwan 0.004*** 0.618*** -0.034*** 0.512*** -7.192*** 0.703 
Thailand 0.006*** 0.456*** -0.007 0.535*** -2.485*** 0.781 
United Kingdom 0.005*** 0.483*** 0.037*** 0.704*** -2.948* 0.807 
United States 0.001*** 0.804*** 0.002 0.190*** -1.387*** 0.859 
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Table 2. Individual effects of modulating variables on herding. We run 42 pool equations of cross-sectional 
absolute standard deviations (CSAD) on the past CSAD, market return, absolute market return, squared market 
return and squared market return interacting with individual modulating variables. Pool equation uses ordinary 
least squares regression with cross-section fixed effects, year dummies and log of GDP. The estimator is designed to 
accommodate heteroscedasticity (White cross section standard errors). The table reports the estimated coefficients 
for herding and herding interacting with individual modulating variables. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 
Equation 1:  
    titititistititititi LogGDPRmDVRmRmRmCSADCSAD ,,62,,52,4,3,21,1,     
 
Cultural Dimension 
 pdi idv mas uai lto ivr 
4 herd -3.643*** -5.193*** -4.326*** -4.649*** -4.471*** -5.284*** 
5 herd*dv -1.609*** 1.444*** -1.117*** -0.764*** -0.901*** 2.073*** 
Governance Dimension 
 va ps ge rq rl cc 
4 herd -5.236*** -5.269*** -5.288*** -5.373*** -5.288*** -5.396*** 
5 herd*dv 2.306*** 2.726*** 1.739*** 2.099*** 1.844*** 2.685*** 
Education and training Dimension 
 het arts ojt est ipp qsri 
4 herd -5.197*** -5.274*** -5.257*** -5.447*** -5.433*** -5.350*** 
5 herd*dv 0.653*** 0.915*** 0.881*** 0.802*** 1.827*** 1.344*** 
Technology Dimension 
 inn srd iui tab trd fdi 
4 herd -5.040*** -5.116*** -5.211*** -5.303*** -5.346*** -5.750*** 
5 herd*dv 0.010 0.165 0.373** 0.514*** 0.651*** 2.264*** 
Business style and conditions Dimension 
 wda bir rpm ecb sars ethb 
4 herd -5.376*** -5.332*** -5.316*** -5.410*** -5.476*** -5.195*** 
5 herd*dv 1.121*** 1.427*** 1.953*** 2.209*** 2.355*** 2.889*** 
Financial development equity markets Dimension 
 pmsi flem eff vca tac nlc 
4 herd -5.276*** -5.379*** -5.492*** -5.556*** -5.625*** -5.367*** 
5 herd*dv 0.656*** 0.696*** 1.528*** 1.637*** 2.104*** 0.473*** 
Financial development non-equity markets Dimension 
 oipds idi lipv nlipv pfa pcdmb 
4 herd -5.257*** -5.108*** -5.475*** 5.496*** -5.379*** -5.088*** 
5 herd*dv 1.908*** 2.715*** 0.872*** 1.120*** 1.516*** 0.326* 
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Table 3. Combined effects of modulating dimensions on herding. We run 6 pool equations of cross-sectional 
absolute standard deviations (CSAD) on the past CSAD, market return, absolute market return and squared market 
return and squared market return interacting with modulating dimensions. Pool equation uses ordinary least 
squares regression with cross-section fixed effects, year dummies and log of GDP. The estimator is designed to 
accommodate heteroscedasticity (White cross section standard errors). The table reports the estimated coefficients 
of pool equations for herding, herding interacting with one single cultural variable (cv: pdi, idv, mas, uai, lto or ivr, 
alternatively) and herding together with orthogonalized modulating dimensions: gov (governance dimension), ed 
(education and training dimension), tech (technology dimension), bus (business style and conditions dimension), fd1 
(financial development equity markets dimension) and fd2 (financial development non-equity markets dimension). 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
Equation 2: 
     
         
titi
tmtitmtitmtitmtitmti
tmtitmti
s
tmtmtmtiti
LogGDP
RGOVREDURBUSRDFRTECH
RDFRCVRRRCSADCSAD
,,12
2
,,11
2
,,10
2
,,9
2
,,8
2
,,7
2
,,6
2
,,5
2
,4,3,21,1,
2
1





 
 
 
 Pool (pdi) Pool (idv) Pool (mas) Pool (uai) Pool (lto) Pool (ivr) 
4 -3.149*** -3.187*** -3.011*** -2.830*** -3.138*** -3.127*** 
5 herd*CV 0.322 -0.920*** -1.245*** 1.276*** 0.073 0.227 
6 herd*fd1 0.791*** 0.744*** 0.717*** 0.639*** 0.806*** 0.784*** 
7 herd*tech -0.713*** -0.690*** -0.893*** -0.856*** -0.723*** -0.756*** 
8 herd*fd2 0.891*** 0.892*** 0.857*** 0.940*** 0.864*** 0.844*** 
9 herd*bus 2.651*** 2.615*** 2.459*** 2.697*** 2.639*** 2.679*** 
10 herd*edu 0.9079** 0.6237* 0.187 0.8448** 0.989** 0.944** 
11 herd*gov -0.928*** -0.890*** -0.805*** -1.020*** -0.910*** -0.922*** 
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